The ascription of meaning: A Wittgensteinian perspective
- 1 August 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Quarterly Journal of Speech
- Vol. 72 (3) , 261-273
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00335638609383773
Abstract
Following Wittgenstein's concept of meaning‐as‐use, this essay argues that the ascription of meaning should be based on the satisfaction of contextual criteria. The usefulness of this notion is demonstrated by showing how it can serve as a bridging concept between general rules and situated contexts.Keywords
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