Terrorism as a Desperate Game

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Abstract
This article examines terrorism both theoretically and empirically. A typology is presented to identify different types of terrorist events and characteristics particular to each. Following this, the negotiations involved in hostage situations are examined with emphasis on government / terrorist response options and event outcomes. Throughout the article, assumptions of the theoretical model are empirically tested utilizing the ITERATE data set. Decision routes are mapped as a method for conceptualizing the tactics involved in bargaining communications. Formal game theory is utilized to explore the complexities involved in modeling government/terrorist interaction regarding: (a) developing an extensive game form; (b) specifying utilities; and (c) constructing illustrative games. Probability functions for an empirically-based decision model are generated by an examination of government/ terrorist responses and outcomes for the cases in the data set. Discriminant function analysis is employed to specify quantitatively the degree to which theoretically identified types are distinct as posited. The argument presented emphasizes the significance of the communications (implicit and direct, calculated and manipulative) which result from the terrorist/target bargaining interaction.

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