Decisions without Consequences: Cost Control and Access in State Medicaid Programs

Abstract
States have implemented a number of strategies to provide services, pay providers, and control Medicaid spending. We test the effects of some differences in state Medicaid policies on program enrollees' access to and use of health care services. Logistic and OLS regression analyses of cross-sectional data indicate that these policies exert significant influences on enrollees' access to health services but have a weaker direct effect on their use of them. However, we find evidence that utilization is affected indirectly (through increased access) by state policy decisions. Somewhat surprisingly, Medicaid policies designed to contain costs by limiting utilization appear to affect neither access nor utilization. Medicaid enrollees have greater access to a private physician in states with higher physician reimbursement and additional Medicare insurance for their enrollees. Other nonpolicy variables with pronounced impacts on access to private office physicians include race and the availability of private insurance.

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