Negotiating with insurgents: Obstacles to peace in the Basque country

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Abstract
Between 1975 and 1988, there were at least 20 identifiable attempts to negotiate an end to the violence of the Basque insurgent group Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), an organization that has been waging armed struggle against the Spanish state since the 1960s. Despite clear evidence that both ETA and the Spanish government want the violence to end, these attempted negotiations have all ended in failure. This study analyses three general sets of reasons for these failures. One set of reasons is contained in the political and social setting within which negotiations take place, and in the ways in which that setting intrudes into and shapes the negotiations. A second set has to do with the linkages between the cessation of violence and the conduct of negotiations. A third cluster of obstacles involves the nature of the negotiation itself, particularly the topics that are allowed on the agenda. This study is founded on the premise that negotiations may be a good way to bring an armed insurgency to a close; but unless fundamental changes are made in the approach to negotiations, they are likely to always end in failure.

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