The Theory of Contractual Incentives for Cost Reduction

1 May 1964

journal article
Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Vol. 78 (2) , 257-280
https://doi.org/10.2307/1879326

Abstract

I. The basic contract types, 258. — II. The contractor's profit maximization problem, 261. — III. Outlay minimization by the government as buyer, 271. — IV. Consistency with empirical evidence, 273. — V. Toward a theory of risk aversion, 276. — VI. Some broader implications, 278.

Keywords

COST REDUCTION
CONTRACTUAL INCENTIVES
CONSISTENCY
BASIC CONTRACT
BROADER IMPLICATIONS
CONTRACTOR'S PROFIT
CONTRACT TYPES
OUTLAY

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: