Vertical Integration in Restructured Electricity Markets: Measuring Market Efficiency and Firm Conduct
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Unlike other studies that have found substantial inefficiencies in restructured electricity markets, this paper provides estimates that reveal relatively competKeywords
All Related Versions
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