Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance Increases for International Conflict and Cooperation

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Abstract
Effects of sharp increases in military assistance on international conflict and cooperation on the part of recipient nations are investigated. Since traditional bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques are often conceptually inapplicable to this subject matter, a quasi-experimental design is used which relies on autoregressive moving average models and exponential smoothing forecasting mechanisms. Twenty-five annual observations, from 1946 through 1970, of 15 Asian nations serve as the data base. Key findings are: (1) sharp increases in military assistance tend to change decidedly the recipient nation's international conflict and cooperative behavior; (2) in a substantial majority of cases examined, the direction of that behavior change is toward increased conflict and decreased cooperation; and (3) a two-year lag between military assistance and behavior change of recipient nations is statistically supported. The effects of increased capabilities as well as bureaucratic politics, habit, expectation, and prior deals are offered as possible reasons for these results. The findings seem to refute the argument that giving military aid to a nation not involved in a war will help strengthen that nation and thereby avoid future conflict.