The distribution of evolutionarily stable strategies
- 1 June 1988
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Applied Probability
- Vol. 25 (2) , 233-246
- https://doi.org/10.2307/3214432
Abstract
Suppose the n × n matrix A gives the payoffs for some evolutionary game, and its entries are the values of independent, identically distributed, continuous random variables. The distribution of the pattern of evolutionarily stable strategies for A will depend, if n ≧ 3, on this underlying distribution. A fairly complete picture for n = 3 is found, and some results are obtained for n ≧ 4.Keywords
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