Abstract
After explaining the adoption of Decision 24 in terms of (a) the logical need to regulate direct foreign investment and technology transfer within regional integrative systems so as to create conditions necessary for the accomplishment of other integrative goals, and (b) the needs of an emergent national bourgeoisie within certain of the Andean countries. the paper demonstrates the extent to which the absence of social forces supportive of re gulation in all of the member countries led to attempts to modify Decision 24 and to divergencies in its implementation by national authorities. By checking the extent to which Decision 24 was applied at the national level the author is then able to examine the impact of Decision 24 on the rate of divestment, on the degree to which direct foreign investment and technology contracts were being subjected to review and renegotiation, and on the inflow of direct foreign investment into the region. In addition the paper presents the results of a survey of the attitudes of 90 managers of chemical and metalworking firms in Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador towards the regulation of direct foreign investment and technology transfer.