Escaping the joint‐decision trap: Repetition and Sectoral politics in the European union
- 1 April 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 20 (2) , 22-36
- https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389708425189
Abstract
Decision making in the European Union has been argued to present a ‘joint‐decision trap’, in which the ability of national actors to block decisions unilaterally produces decision making by the lowest common denominator. While this outcome is apparent in some decision situations it is far from a general outcome. The division of decisions into functional specialities and the continuing nature of the policy debates limits the capacity of ‘high politics’ to hinder decision making. Further, there are ways in which a policy entrepreneur can structure decisions to eliminate this sub‐optimal outcome.Keywords
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