A Theory of Bounded Deterrence
- 1 June 1973
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 17 (2) , 243-269
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277301700204
Abstract
According to this analysis, the deterrent relationship is bounded by two concepts, the nuclear threshold and the level of unacceptable damage, each of which is a function of the utility of the threatened objective to both deterrer and aggressor. The crucial assumption of the theory, that the utility of foreign policy objectives varies with the objective, is tested empirically regarding American attitudes toward security commitments. Five variables loading on three dimensions predict the utility of these commitments. A consequence of the theory is that it calls into doubt government assertions that the nuclear umbrella provides as much security to allies as to the deterrer.Keywords
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