PROPERTY RIGHTS, EFFICIENCY AND LABOR‐MANAGED FIRMS
- 1 September 1989
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
- Vol. 60 (3) , 341-358
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.1989.tb01537.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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