TAXES, TORTS, AND THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY: CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON INSTRUMENTS TO CONTROL POLLUTION
- 1 October 1997
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 35 (4) , 745-762
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01961.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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