Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:
- 1 June 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 43 (7) , 1395-1434
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00128-7
Abstract
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