Monitoring, loan renegotiability, and firm value: The role of lending syndicates
- 1 April 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 20 (3) , 577-593
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(95)00006-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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