A refined look at Bernstein's AES side-channel analysis

21 March 2006

proceedings article
Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)

p. 369
https://doi.org/10.1145/1128817.1128887

Abstract

In a recent manuscript Dan Bernstein claims the successful extraction of an AES key from a network server through another client computer. His side-channel attack was actually the simplest conceivable timing analysis of AES. Although Bernstein gave no thorough analysis of his methodology or the underlying technique the paper contained the full C-source code. This was actually very useful to repeat, analyze and extend his experiments and technique. Our paper improves upon the work done by Bernstein in the following ways:

Keywords

AES
CACHE-STATE ANALYSIS
COMPUTER SECURITY
INFORMATION LEAKAGE
S-BOX TABLES
SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS
TIMING ANALYSIS

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