Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour

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Abstract
The book covers the modern developments in Evolutionary Game Theory, with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated within the field of theoretical biology, focusing on the core notions of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Replicator Dynamics. Both the static and dynamic approaches of this biological literature are presented in detail, and the general analysis illustrated with numerous examples. It then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. After a discussion of strictly deterministic dynamic models, stochastic perturbations are introduced in order to account for the social‐ and individual‐based sources of ‘noise’ (including aggregate shocks, agents’ experimentation, and population renewal), which play an important role in evolutionary processes.

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