Minds, Machines and Gödel
- 1 April 1961
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy
- Vol. 36 (137) , 112-127
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100057983
Abstract
Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- On not Worshipping FactsThe Philosophical Quarterly, 1958
- I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCEMind, 1950
- Extensions of some theorems of Gödel and ChurchThe Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1936