Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
- 1 December 1989
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 49 (4) , 803-832
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700009451
Abstract
The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.Keywords
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