Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 8 (1) , 20-55
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80016-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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