A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance

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  • 1 January 2007
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      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
The paper studies outside finance in a model of two-dimensional moral hazard, involving risk choices as well as effort choices. If the entrepreneur has insu¢ cient funds, a first-best outcome cannot be implemented. Second-best outcomes involve greater failure risk than first-best outcomes. For a Cobb-Douglas technology, second-best effort and investment levels are smaller than first-best; for other technologies, they depend on the elasticity of substitution. If firm returns not too noisy signals of be-haviour, suitable incentives can be provided by some mix of debt and equity issues. If firm returns involve too much noise, this is not possible.
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