An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information
- 1 June 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 48 (2) , 197-216
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00216-5
Abstract
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This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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