Do Equity-Based Incentives Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of Consecutive Earnings Increases?
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This study provides empirical evidence that equity-based incentives (stock and stock options) encourage CEOs to manage earnings to increase short run stock pricKeywords
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management IncentivesJournal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 2003
- Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors?Journal of Accounting Research, 2003
- Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines across Publicly and Privately Held BanksThe Accounting Review, 2002
- Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and VolatilityJournal of Accounting Research, 2002
- CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosuresJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2000
- The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levelsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1999
- Market Rewards Associated with Patterns of Increasing EarningsJournal of Accounting Research, 1999
- Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and lossesJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1997
- Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1996
- Detection of Influential Observation in Linear RegressionTechnometrics, 1977