Abstract
Patricia Smith Churchland's Neurophilosophy argues that a mind is the same thing as the complex patterns of neural activity in a human brain and, furthermore, that we will be able to find out interesting things about the mind by studying the brain. I basically agree with this stance and my comments are divided into four sections. First, comparisons between human and non‐human primate brains are discussed in the context, roughly, of where one should locate higher functions. Second, I examine Churchland's views on reduction and levels of organization, which I find mostly congenial. Third, a key point of disagreement about the relationship and importance of language to specifically human cognition is taken up. I like Churchland's critique of certain sentential paradigms, but I try to show using an analogy with cellular coding systems why we need to get a better theory of ‘sentences’. Finally, I discuss how the models introduced in the last chapter might be extended to make better contact with neurobiology and language.

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