On renegotiation design
- 1 May 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 34 (2-3) , 322-329
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(90)90104-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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