The revelation of information in strategic market games: A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
- 31 December 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 16 (2) , 105-137
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90002-4
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