A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- 1 July 1992
- journal article
- review article
- Published by JSTOR in Econometrica
- Vol. 60 (4) , 745-780
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2951565
Abstract
The goal of choice-theoretic derivations of subjective probability is to separate a decision maker's underlying beliefs (subjective probabilities of events) from their preferences (attitudes toward risk). Classical derivations have all relied upon some form of the Marschak-Samuelson "Independence Axiom" or the Savage "Sure-Thing Principle," which imply that preferences over lotteries conform to the expected utility hypothesis. This paper presents a choice-theoretic derivation of subjective probability, in a Savage-type setting of purely subjective uncertainty, which neither assumes nor implies that the decision maker's preferences over lotteries necessarily conform to the expected utility hypothesis.Keywords
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This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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