Competitive Fair Division
- 1 April 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 109 (2) , 418-443
- https://doi.org/10.1086/319550
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical ExchangeEconometrica, 2000
- Fair-negotiation proceduresMathematical Social Sciences, 2000
- Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair DivisionThe American Mathematical Monthly, 1999
- House Allocation with Existing TenantsJournal of Economic Theory, 1999
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goodsSocial Choice and Welfare, 1999
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation ProblemsEconometrica, 1998
- Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments: Extended Queues versus Committee ExpansionAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1988
- Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to PositionsJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to PositionsJournal of Political Economy, 1979
- COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERSThe Journal of Finance, 1961