Abstract
This paper tests the popular thesis that as a result of various changes over the past decade, the subsystemliron triangle model is no longer the central dynamic in federal water policymaking. A cross section of 30 authorities were interviewed on two aspects of this key dispute: (a) the extent to which iron triangle tenets were either central (traditional viewpoint) or secondary (revisionist viewpoint) to the Carter administrationls 1977 water projects “hit list” 81 defeat, 11 and (b) perceptions of the viability of the leading water alliances in the years since the hit list events. Major findings: (1) Although the two leading water subsystems are portrayed as having been weakened by recent challenges, they are viewed by subsystem insidersll and “outsiders” alike as the most powerful of six alternative explanations for the Carter “defeat.” (2) The alliances are largely pursuing a strategy aimed at adapting (Ripley and Franklinls “adapting subsystems”) to the threatening political climate based on extensive funding for operations and maintenance. (3) The argument is advanced that the traditional‐revisionist dispute is bridged by cyclical policy dynamics, labeled the policy pacing dimension.

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