Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’
- 1 January 1996
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 63 (S3) , S306-S314
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289965
Abstract
Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the ‘no miracle’ argument and the ‘pessimistic induction’. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist’s belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the ‘pessimistic induction’, presents a move—the divide et impera move—that neutralizes it, and motivates a substantive yet realistic version of scientific realism. This move is also compared with Worrall’s and Kitcher’s recent reactions to the ‘pessimistic induction’.Keywords
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