The demand for cost allocations: The case of incentive contracts versus fixed-price contracts
Open Access
- 30 November 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 8 (3) , 165-180
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0278-4254(89)90002-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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