Electoral Coalitions and Institutional Stability: The Case of Metropolitan Reform in Dade County, Florida
- 1 August 1991
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 53 (3) , 701-719
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2131576
Abstract
While theoretical results demonstrate that majority rule is unstable, there are few documented cases of cyclical majority preferences. This paper uses survey data on the preferences of citizens for metropolitan reform to document one such case. The paper demonstrates voting cycles over proposed reforms for the whole electorate, ethnic voting blocs, and plausible coalitions within the electorate. For this case, intransitive coalition preferences and ethnic group frictions prevent the formation of a stable reform coalition. The stability of the status quo proposal is attributed to the referendum process used to reform Metro-Dade County.Keywords
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