Costly Information Production Equilibria in the Bank Credit Market with Applications to Credit Rationing

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  • 1 January 2004
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      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
In this paper we explore the nature of equilibria in an asymmetrically informed bank credit market in which credit applicants know their own (intrinsic) default risks, but potential lenders can discover these default risks only by expending resources to produce information. The resolution of informational asymmetries in the capital market is, in the contemporary view, considered a very import function served by financial intermediaries like commercial banks and, in the opinion of some, even the primary justification for their existence. We, therefore, focus on how the presence of asymmetrice information--in particular, the response of (expected) profit-maximizing banks to it--affects the equilibrium prices and quantities of credit offered in the banking system.
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