Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
Top Cited Papers
- 5 November 2001
- proceedings article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 255-264
- https://doi.org/10.1145/501983.502018
Abstract
Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman scheme and prove its security.Keywords
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