ELECTORAL POLITICS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:

• A model of electroral competition with interest groups
  Economics Letters, 1990
• Existence of electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
  Journal of Public Economics, 1988
• Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
  Public Choice, 1987
• Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
  American Political Science Review, 1986
• Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs
  Journal of Public Economics, 1985
• The Potentials and Limits of the Market in Resource Allocation
  Published by Springer Nature ,1985
• Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections
  The Journal of Politics, 1984
• A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983
• Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition
  The Journal of Politics, 1982
• The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President
  The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1978