Regulation, Institutions, and Commitment in Telecommunications: A Comparative Analysis of Five Country Studies
- 1 December 1993
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 7 (suppl 1) , 215-252
- https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/7.suppl_1.215
Abstract
Within any system of utility regulation, there is a tension between the ability to commit to a stable set of rules and the ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Countries differ in their institutional endowments and hence in the ways in which they can resolve this tension. A first group of countries can design regulatory systems that afford the regulator substantial formal discretion to respond to changing circumstances and can use process to restrain arbitrary action. A second group of countries can restrain arbitrary action only by calling on specific substantive rules and may have to sacrifice some flexibility to achieve credible commitment. A third group may lack the domestic institutions to put in place a credible and workable regulatory system of any kind.Keywords
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