Collectivities as Actors

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Abstract
This article concerns the nature of “collective” preferences, when preferences inhere only in individuals. Economists (e.g., Arrow) have concluded that there is no reasonable way to combine individual preferences. Nevertheless, sociologists routinely treat collectivities (e.g., small groups, organizations, social classes, or ethnic groups) as entities with consistent preferences. This article suggests that consistency of collective choices arises from the social context. Specifically, many collective choices are matters of “judgment,” rather than matters of purely personal “preference.” In matters of judgment, natural groups tend to have shared standards that are used by individuals in determining their own preferences. Under such conditions, even when many individuals “get it wrong,” the group majorities tend to “get it right.” Social philosophers have suggested that when individuals attend to the public good, group majorities tend to accurately reflect the collective interest (Durkheim's “collective conscience” and Rousseau's “general will”). However, these philosophers have never suggested any empirical indicators of the emergence of the collective interest. This article suggests that if individuals are judging alternatives by shared standards, then there should be predictable patterns in the sizes of the majorities by which they make their choices. Votes from 36 different elections in nonprofit organizations, unions, and professional associations are analyzed and shown to be consistent with the patterns expected to arise from judgments by shared standards. Implications for future research into a wide variety of interdisciplinary issues are discussed.

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