Fear and Loathing in Falluja
- 1 July 2006
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Armed Forces & Society
- Vol. 32 (4) , 623-639
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x05281460
Abstract
Why should it be so difficult for the United States, with its overwhelming military edge, to counter low-level conflict? An answer is suggested by the paradigmatic example of U.S. operations in Falluja in April 2004. Falluja shows that the Bush administration and its military commanders treat power as a possession or capability independent of the relationship in which it is to be exercised, whereas power in Iraq is better understood in terms of relationships. Considered in this light, Falluja clarifies several issues shaping U.S. understanding of power and offers insight into the application of conventional force against insurgentsKeywords
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