Risk-free incentive contracts: Eliminating agency cost using option-based compensation schemes
- 31 October 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 447-473
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90035-e
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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