Assessing Competition in The Market for Corporate Control: Australian Evidence
- 1 June 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Australian Journal of Management
- Vol. 11 (1) , 23-50
- https://doi.org/10.1177/031289628601100103
Abstract
Ruback (1983) proposed a novel test of competition in the market for corporate control. He argued the market would be competitive if, in the context of two or more bidders, it did not pay an unsuccessful offeror to lift his bid to the successful offeror's price. Ruback's evidence was consistent with the American corporate acquisitions market being competitive, in this sense. We use Australian data to replicate Ruback's test. Our results mirror Ruback's, in that 58 out of 72 takeovers were consistent with a competitive Australian market. The 14 inconsistencies could have been due to bidder collusion, strategic behaviour, legal impediments, or quite possibly, confounding events.Keywords
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