Secure program partitioning
- 1 August 2002
- journal article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
- Vol. 20 (3) , 283-328
- https://doi.org/10.1145/566340.566343
Abstract
This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrain information flow; these programs can then be partitioned automatically to run securely on heterogeneously trusted hosts. The resulting communicating subprograms collectively implement the original program, yet the system as a whole satisfies the security requirements of participating principals without requiring a universally trusted host machine. The experience in applying this methodology and the performance of the resulting distributed code suggest that this is a promising way to obtain secure distributed computation.Keywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- From system F to typed assembly languageACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 1999
- On the (Im)possibility of Basing Oblivious Transfer and Bit Commitment on Weakened Security AssumptionsPublished by Springer Nature ,1999
- Multilevel security in the UNIX traditionSoftware: Practice and Experience, 1992
- Fine-grained mobility in the Emerald systemACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 1988
- A Randomized Protocol for Signing ContractsPublished by Springer Nature ,1983
- A Technique for Proving Specifications are Multilevel SecurePublished by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) ,1980
- Certification of programs for secure information flowCommunications of the ACM, 1977
- A lattice model of secure information flowCommunications of the ACM, 1976
- Security Kernel validation in practiceCommunications of the ACM, 1976
- Memoryless subsystemsThe Computer Journal, 1974