Executive compensation and non-financial risk: An empirical examination
- 1 July 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 26 (4) , 436-462
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.05.001
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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