The Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Corporate and Labor Pac Contributions
- 1 January 2001
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 29 (1) , 98-109
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x01029001007
Abstract
This study investigates the impact congressional roll call votes on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had on corporate and labor political action committee (PAC) contributions during the 1994 House elections. The results show that corporate PACs gave more money to incumbents who voted in favor of NAFTA and that labor PACs contributed less money to pro-NAFTA incumbents, including Democrats in competitive races. The findings mark a departure from the existing literature, which indicates that corporations and unions rarely place an emphasis on particular roll call votes when providing their campaign money to candidates.Keywords
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