Seeing and knowing: On the ascription of mental states to young children.
- 1 December 1987
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Canadian Journal of Psychology / Revue canadienne de psychologie
- Vol. 41 (4) , 399-411
- https://doi.org/10.1037/h0084171
Abstract
In the language and thought of adults, a clear distinction is usually drawn between what one sees, what one infers or thinks on the basis of what one sees, and what one is certain of or knows to be the case. We shall present some evidence that young children do not make such distinctions, but rather conflate what they see with the interpretations they assign. We use this evidence to argue against the ascription of certain types of mental states to young children, animals and computers.This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- Early Understanding of Mental Entities: A Reexamination of Childhood RealismChild Development, 1986
- Seeing and Believing: Children's Understanding of the Distinction between Appearance and RealityChild Development, 1984
- Developmental Changes in the Contribution of Shared Experience to Social Role-Taking CompetenceInternational Journal of Behavioral Development, 1984