On Being Unreasonable
- 14 March 1973
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 40 (1) , 1-9
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288492
Abstract
The problem of the critical assessment of theories across paradigms raised by Kuhn is not resolved, it is argued, either by Scheffler's appeal to initial credibility or by Lakatos' conception of a research program. It is argued further that, in these contexts, the notion of reasonable choice by individuals makes no sense. The conclusion supports Feyerabend's position of “epistemological anarchism.”Keywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
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- The Justification of Scientific ChangePublished by Springer Nature ,1971
- Criticism and the Growth of KnowledgePublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1970
- The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific TheoriesPhilosophy of Science, 1961