Gaining Regulatory Compliance

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Abstract
When regulatory inspectors deal with uncooperative violators who initially refuse to correct violations, inspectors must exert various kinds of power to persuade or force the violators to comply with regulatory requirements. This article draws upon interview data from a case study of food and dairy inspection in Wisconsin to identify the ways in which inspectors' power to gain compliance is undermined by the formal policies and informal organizational culture of the agency. Because of inadequate training, pressure to spend less time on inspections, and norms discouraging assertiveness, inspectors' power to obtain compliance through persuasion is limited. Inspectors' power and their desire to use formal enforcement mechanisms is also circumscribed. As a result, inspectors may allow violations to continue unabated because they lack the capacity to persuade or force the violator to make the needed corrections.

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