Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology
- 1 March 1994
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 61 (1) , 55-75
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289780
Abstract
Individualists claim that wide explanations in psychology are problematic. I argue that wide psychological explanations sometimes have greater explanatory power than individualistic explanations. The aspects of explanatory power I focus on arecausal depthandtheoretical appropriateness.Reflection on the depth and appropriateness of other wide explanations of behavior, such as evolutionary explanations, clarifies why wide psychological explanations sometimes have more causal depth and theoretical appropriateness than narrow psychological explanations. I also argue for the rejection of eliminative materialism.Keywords
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