Monitoring as a Motivation for IPO Underpricing
- 1 October 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 59 (5) , 2403-2420
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00703.x
Abstract
Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) provide contrasting arguments for why monitoring considerations create incentives for managers to underprice their firms' IPOs (initial public offerings). Like Smart and Zutter (2003), we examine these arguments using a sample of U.S. IPOs. However, we find evidence that the determinants of initial returns, institutional shareholdings, and post‐IPO likelihood of acquisition are not consistent with these arguments. Thus, we conclude that monitoring considerations are not important determinants of IPO underpricing.Keywords
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