Hidden Gaming in Hierarchies: Facts and Models
- 1 December 1988
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 64 (4) , 295-306
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1988.tb02068.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent ProblemsEconometrica, 1985
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many AgentsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1984
- A Comparison of Tournaments and ContractsJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent ProblemEconometrica, 1983
- On Coalition Incentive CompatibilityThe Review of Economic Studies, 1979
- Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979