The Dynamics of Moral Beliefs and Minor Deviance

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Abstract
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between belief in conventional morality and minor forms of deviant behavior. It argues that social control theory offers a less-powerful explanation of deviance than cultural deviance perspectives because logically it cannot explain why persons select one deviant act over another. Nevertheless, control theory offers a more parsimonious conceptualization of belief and deviance, and therefore, if supported empirically, should be retained over competing theories. Drawing on this framework, a dynamic model of the reciprocal causal structure of belief and deviance is specified, and hypotheses about substantive and measurement processes are derived. A structural equation model for panel data allowing for response errors is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator of Jöreskog's LISREL approach. The data, drawn from the Youth in Transition Project, provide four waves of data on a national sample of tenth-grade boys. The results fail to replicate previous research, which found support for social control theory's stipulation of the relationship between belief and deviance. Contrary to previous results of cross-sectional studies, the effect of belief on deviance is relatively small and dwarfed by the effect of deviance on belief.

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